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ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS IN LITIGATION 
Douglas R. Richmond* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assume for a moment that you represent a party in a property dispute and 
sue the opposing landowner in federal court. The district court determines that it 
lacks jurisdiction over the matter and dismisses the case, further holding that you 
should be sanctioned for filing the action.1 As a sanction, the district court orders you 
to take and pass a law school class on federal jurisdiction.2 You appeal and the 
appellate court agrees that the sanction was inappropriate. Unfortunately, it 
disapproves of the sanction largely because it would burden a law school to accept a 
practicing lawyer as a student.3 The appellate court believes that “it would be more 
appropriate” for you to attend continuing legal education (CLE) courses on federal 
court practice and it thus encourages the district court to consider such a sanction on 
remand.4 Your appellate victory is perhaps not Pyrrhic—after all, a law school course 
would be expensive and impose an inflexible time and examination commitment, so 
a CLE mandate represents some improvement—but nor is it a win worth celebrating. 
Alternatively, consider the consequences of the lawyers’ incivility in 
Huggins v. Coatesville Area School District.5 In Huggins, the plaintiff’s lawyer, 
Lewis Hannah, and a defense lawyer, James Ellison, had “heated, personal, rude, and 
pointless” exchanges during a deposition.6 Hannah was the provocateur and 
“ratcheted the acrimony higher and the standards lower,” but Ellison gave as good 
as he got.7 The defendants thereafter moved for a protective order and for sanctions.8 
Instead of ordering Hannah to pay the defendants’ costs and fees incurred in bringing 
the motion—which the court rejected as a sanction based on Ellison’s complicity—
the court selected a sanction intended to “have greater long-term substantive effect.”9 
The court required Hannah to attend a CLE course addressing civility and 
professionalism, and ordered Hannah and Ellison to join each other for a meal within 
a few weeks, Dutch treat, in an attempt to repair their professional relationship.10 
 
 *  Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas. J.D., University of 
Kansas School of Law. Opinions expressed here are the author’s alone. 
 1. Willhite v. Collins, 459 F.3d 866, 869–70 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the imposition of sanctions 
based on Rule 11 and the district court’s inherent powers). 
 2. Id. at 870. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
16, 2009). 
 6. Id. at *1. 
 7. See id. at *1–2. 
 8. See id. at *2. 
 9. Id. at *4. 
 10. Id. 
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A Florida federal court also went beyond mandatory CLE attendance as a 
sanction when a plaintiff’s lawyer, Aryn Fuller, missed a pretrial conference, failed 
to submit a confidential case statement for a settlement conference, was late for the 
first day of trial, and did not have a witness available at trial as required.11 The court 
ordered Fuller to join the Federal Bar Association (FBA), attend a FBA webinar on 
federal civil litigation basics, and arrange for a mentor through the FBA.12 
Finally, consider Oklahoma lawyer Gerard Pignato’s sanction for 
“unprofessional letters” he sent to opposing counsel.13 The court directed him “to 
submit to the Oklahoma Bar Journal for publication an article pertaining to civility 
and professionalism as they relate to adversary proceedings.”14 The court further 
ordered Pignato to state in the article why wrote it, target as his audience 
inexperienced lawyers, and provide the court with a copy of the article upon its 
submission for publication.15 Pignato wrote a conforming Oklahoma Bar Journal 
article that was published within the time allotted by the court, although the 
published version of the article made no mention of why he wrote it.16 Other courts 
have likewise required lawyers to write bar journal articles as a sanction.17 
The non-monetary sanctions imposed on these lawyers may fairly be 
characterized as alternative sanctions; they were imposed instead of monetary 
sanctions or traditional non-monetary sanctions that affect a lawyer’s ability to 
litigate a case, such as revoking the lawyer’s pro hac vice admission. Alternative 
sanctions may further be categorized as reflective sanctions where they are intended 
to cause offending lawyers to reflect on their conduct with a goal of reform, or as 
shaming sanctions where they are intended to shame errant lawyers into improving 
their behavior and, in addition, to deter other lawyers from engaging in similar 
misconduct. Ordering a lawyer to attend a CLE program is the most common 
example of a reflective sanction.18 This sanction requires no public 
 
 11. Order Imposing Sanctions at 1, Sindicich v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. 6:14-cv-889-Orl-
37KRS, 2016 WL 3563874 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2016), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/287281291/Sindicich-Sanctions-Order-1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Order at 1, Johnson v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., Case No. CIV-07-868-M (W.D. Okla. Apr. 14, 
2008) (imposing non-monetary sanctions). 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Gerard F. Pignato, Professionalism for Attorneys—Young and Old, 79 OKLA. B.J. 2827 
(2008), http://www.okbar.org/Portals/13/PDF/OBJ/2008/December%2013.pdf. 
 17. See, e.g., St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 518 (N.D. Iowa 
2000) (sparing the lawyer some embarrassment by stating that did not have to say in the article that he 
was required to write it as a sanction). 
 18. Judges routinely require lawyers to attend CLE programs as a sanction for litigation-related 
misconduct. See, e.g., In re Vialet, 460 F. App’x 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring the lawyer to 
complete 12 hours of CLE in addition to the hours normally required of New York lawyers); In re Hsu, 
451 F. App’x 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2011) (requiring the lawyer to complete a CLE course on each of three 
specified subjects); Edmonds v. Seavey, 379 F. App’x 62, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming the district 
court’s Rule 11 sanction requiring a lawyer to “attend CLE courses in the relevant area” because he did 
“not appear to comprehend the civil RICO statute”); Willhite v. Collins, 459 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(suggesting mandatory CLE courses as a sanction rather than making the lawyer complete a law school 
class); Balthazar v. Atl. City Med. Ctr., 137 F. App’x 482, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district 
court’s order that the lawyer attend two CLE courses, one on federal practice and procedure and one on 
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acknowledgement of error or wrongdoing by the lawyer. In most cases, no other 
lawyers will know why the sanctioned lawyer is attending a particular CLE course. 
At the same time, judges who order lawyers to attend CLE programs do not believe 
that the lawyers will change their behaviors or improve their practices solely as a 
result of the content delivered during those seminars. Rather, self-analysis by the 
lawyer of the need to change her behavior or enhance her professional knowledge or 
skills is a principal goal of mandatory CLE attendance, even if it is not the only goal. 
 
professional responsibility); Thomas v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., No. 00-30056, 2001 WL 
274750, at *1–2 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2001) (approving a sanction of five hours of CLE courses in lieu of 
awarding attorneys’ fees); In re Marshall, No. 3:15-MC-88-JWD, 2016 WL 81484, at *8, *12 (M.D. La. 
Jan. 7, 2016) (ordering the lawyer to complete six hours of CLE on ethics or professionalism in addition 
to other sanctions for repeatedly failing to meet deadlines, disregarding court rules, and failing to appear 
for a scheduling conference); Burrage-Simon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-cv-00429-
GMN-NJK, 2015 WL 5224885, at *1, *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2015) (ordering the lawyer to attend an ethics-
based CLE course in addition to paying a monetary sanction); Broussard v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t, No. 
6:13-cv-2872, 2015 WL 5025345, at *6–8 (W.D. La. Aug. 20, 2015) (ordering the lawyers to complete 
in the next 17 months 21 hours of CLE courses in addition to any CLE credit otherwise required or 
completed); Wise v. Wash. Cty., No. 10-1677, 2015 WL 1757730, at *37 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2015) 
(requiring the plaintiff’s lawyers to attend CLE courses; one of the lawyers had to attend two courses, the 
other had to attend only one); Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, Nos. 13-4811, 13-6407, 2015 WL 
965976, at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2015) (relying on FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2) in ordering a lawyer to 
“attend an additional five (5) hours of continuing legal education over and above what he is required to 
attend . . . all of which must be in the area of professionalism and/or ethics” as a sanction for his 
“unprofessional personal insults” directed at opposing counsel during depositions); Cruz-Aponte v. 
Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 123 F. Supp. 3d 276, 278–81 (D.P.R. 2015) (ordering a lawyer to complete 
a professionalism course for saying, “You’re not going through menopause, I hope,” to a female lawyer 
who complained about the heat in the room where depositions were being taken); Rivas v. Bowling Green 
Assocs., No. 13-cv-7812 (PKC), 2014 WL 3694983, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (ordering the 
plaintiff’s law firm to “require each partner or member of the firm admitted to practice before this [c]ourt 
who practices in the field of litigation to attend a continuing education program” on topics specified by 
the court); Torres v. City of Houston, Civ. A. No. H-12-2323, 2013 WL 2408056, at *10 (S.D. Tex. May 
31, 2013) (ordering the plaintiff’s attorney “as a remedial and prophylactic measure more than a sanction” 
to complete 14 hours of CLE courses “in addition to the CLE required of all active attorneys,” and further 
mandating that the specified courses could not be taken on-line); Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., Case 
No. 98-6559-CIV-ZLOCH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23667, at *81 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 1999) (ordering the 
lawyer to obtain five hours of CLE credit on legal ethics within one year in addition to other sanctions); 
Bullard v. Chrysler Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1180, 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (sanctioning the lawyer under Rule 
11 and requiring him to complete 10 hours of CLE on legal ethics in addition to other penalties); LaVigna 
v. WABC Television, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ordering the lawyer to attend 12 hours 
of CLE programming in addition to paying a $250 fine); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat’l Corp., 893 F. 
Supp. 827, 833 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (offering the lawyers the alternative of petitioning to vacate monetary 
sanctions by agreeing to successfully complete specified CLE seminars); In re Morton, Case No. 3:15-
bk-30892-SHB, 2015 WL 5731859, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2015) (requiring two lawyers “to 
attend ten hours of ethics continuing legal education above what is required for maintaining their 
Tennessee law licenses,” in addition to imposing significant monetary penalties and requiring the lawyers 
to report themselves to Tennessee disciplinary authorities); Goldberg v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. of Greater 
Miami, LLC (In re S. Beach Cmty. Hosp.), Case No. 06-10634-BKC-LMI, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2780, at 
*3, *10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 3, 2007) (requiring the lawyer to attend a full-day professionalism course 
as a sanction for disagreeing with the court’s reasoning during oral argument by stating: “I suggest with 
respect, Your Honor, that you’re a few French Fries short of a Happy Meal in terms of what’s likely to 
take place.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Shaming sanctions, as the description suggest, include a demonstration or 
display of penitence by errant lawyers.19 Pignato’s case offers a good example of a 
shaming sanction; it would be a perfect example had his Oklahoma Bar Journal 
article stated the reason for its publication as the court ordered. 
Alternative sanctions became a subject of concern and controversy among 
practicing lawyers when in 2014 the district court in Security National Bank of Sioux 
City v. Abbott Laboratories,20 acting on its own, sanctioned a lawyer from a leading 
global law firm for misconduct during depositions she defended.21 The lawyer’s 
misconduct included (1) making an “astounding number” of improper objections; (2) 
repeatedly objecting and interjecting in ways that coached witnesses how to answer 
questions; and (3) excessively interrupting the depositions, thereby delaying and 
frustrating witnesses’ examinations.22 While the court’s decision to sanction the 
lawyer on its own rather than in response to a motion by another party was itself 
noteworthy, the court’s shaming sanction in particular attracted lawyers’ attention: 
Counsel must write and produce a training video in which Counsel, 
or another partner in Counsel’s firm, appears and explains the 
holding and rationale of this opinion, and provides specific steps 
lawyers must take to comply with its rationale in future depositions 
in any federal and state court. The video must specifically address 
the impropriety of unspecified “form” objections, witness 
coaching, and excessive interruptions. The lawyer appearing in the 
video may mention the few jurisdictions that actually require only 
unspecified “form” objections and may suggest that such 
objections are proper in only those jurisdictions. The lawyer in the 
video must state that the video is being produced and distributed 
pursuant to a federal court’s sanction order regarding a partner in 
the firm, but the lawyer need not state the name of the partner, the 
case the sanctions arose under, or the court issuing this order.23 
The court additionally required the lawyer to obtain its approval of the 
video, and thereafter to make it known and available to each lawyer her global law 
firm who engaged in federal or state litigation or who worked in any practice group 
in which at least two of the lawyers had appeared in any federal or state case in the 
United States.24 The lawyer also had to demonstrate compliance with the order by 
 
 19. See, e.g., DeLuca v. Seare (In re Seare), 515 B.R. 599, 621 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (affirming a 
lower court’s sanction order requiring the lawyer to provide a copy of that order to certain potential clients 
for the next two years “as a means of informing the bar that being disciplined for unethical conduct has 
repercussions beyond just paying a fine and moving on”); Salmon v. CRST Expedited, Inc., Case No. 14-
CV-0265-CVE-TLW, 2016 WL 3945362, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 19, 2016) (requiring a novice lawyer “to 
speak to students at the University of Tulsa College of Law about the dangers of filing a lawsuit as a 
licensed legal intern” as a sanction for filing a frivolous lawsuit; also ordering the young lawyer to pay 
$3,000 in attorneys’ fees). 
 20. 299 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones 
Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 21. Id. at 610–11. 
 22. Id. at 600. 
 23. Id. at 610 (footnote omitted). 
 24. Id. 
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filing an affidavit along with a copy of the notice about the video that was circulated 
within the firm.25 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, but in doing so it did not 
criticize the choice of sanction.26 Rather, it reversed because “[s]o unusual a sanction 
required the district court to give particularized notice of the nature of the sanction it 
had in mind so that counsel would have a meaningful opportunity to respond,” and 
the district court did not provide such notice.27 Indeed, the nature of the district 
court’s sanction became known only when it issued its opinion.28 As a result, the 
alternative sanction could not stand.29 
The district court and Eighth Circuit decisions in National Bank of Sioux 
City require courts and lawyers to focus attention on alternative sanctions against 
lawyers. This Article is intended to help guide them in that process. It begins in Part 
II with an overview of the sources of courts’ authority or power to sanction lawyers, 
focusing on bases for imposing alternative sanctions and highlighting illustrative 
cases as appropriate. In discussing sanctions premised on procedural rules, Part II 
focuses on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than state rules simply because 
the federal case law is well-developed. Finally, Part III focuses on the richly 
illustrative decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City and the broader lessons 
to be learned from that case. 
II. COURTS’ AUTHORITY TO SANCTION LAWYERS 
Depending on the case, courts may impose alternative sanctions on lawyers 
(a) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and state equivalents; (b) under several 
rules of civil procedure beyond Rule 11; and (c) pursuant to their inherent power to 
regulate the conduct of those who appear before them. Other common bases for 
sanctioning lawyers, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 do not permit alternative sanctions. 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is perhaps the best-known basis for 
imposing sanctions. Rule 11 governs lawyers’ misconduct in presenting pleadings, 
written motions, and other papers to courts.30 Rule 11 does not apply to disclosures 
under Rule 26 or to discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions.31 
Regarding documents and related conduct within its scope, Rule 11(b) provides: 
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, 
filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 27. Id. at 945. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 5(C)(1), at 89–90 
(5th ed. 2013). 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d). 
214 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 47; No.2 
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances: 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly 
increase the cost of litigation; 
 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law; 
 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery; and 
 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the 
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably 
based on belief or a lack of information.32 
Rule 11(c) governs sanctions for violations of Rule 11(b): 
 (c) Sanctions. 
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 
11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an 
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party 
that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. 
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be 
held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its 
partner, associate, or employee. 
 
(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be 
made separately from any other motion and must describe 
the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). 
The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not 
be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged 
paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn 
or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or 
within another time the court sets. . . . 
 
(3) On the Court’s Initiative. On its own, the court may 
order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why 
conduct specifically described in the order has not 
violated Rule 11(b). 
 
 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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(4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this 
rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of 
the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary 
directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if 
imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of 
part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other 
expenses directly resulting from the violation. 
 
* * * 
 
(6) Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a 
sanction must describe the sanctioned conduct and 
explain the basis for the sanction.33 
States have adopted their own versions of Rule 11.34 
Under Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 applies “in 
all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated 
in Rule 81.”35 Rule 11 therefore applies in actions and proceedings based on both 
diversity and federal question jurisdiction.36 The limitation in Rule 1 that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure apply to civil matters in district courts clarifies that Rule 
11 does not apply to appellate proceedings,37 with the possible exception of certain 
securities actions.38 Likewise, Rule 11 does not apply in criminal cases or in 
bankruptcy cases; lawyers’ misconduct in those cases is punished or remedied under 
other authorities.39 
The standard for determining whether Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate 
depends on how the question is raised. When weighing the appropriateness of Rule 
11 sanctions based on a party’s motion, courts employ an objective standard of 
reasonableness.40 When imposing sanctions on their own initiative under Rule 
 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 34. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-211 (2012); MO. SUP. CT. R. 55.03. 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Rule 81 identifies the federal proceedings to which the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do and do not apply. See FED. R. CIV. P. 81. 
 36. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (“We give the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning.”). 
 37. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 406 (1990). 
 38. See Gurary v. Nu-Tech Bio-Med, Inc., 303 F.3d 212, 225–26 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing the 
PSLRA and stating that “[o]nce the presumption [against plaintiffs in unfounded and abusive securities 
fraud cases] is triggered and is not rebutted, however, it seems most likely that Congress meant for the 
defendant to receive fees and costs incurred in seeking sanctions . . . including all reasonable expenses 
related to appellate proceedings.”). 
 39. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 5(B)(1), at 87 (“While misbehavior in criminal cases may be punishable 
under other authorities, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the inherent power of the court[,] . . . it is not 
sanctionable under Rule 11.”); 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) (governing bankruptcy cases and stating that 
“[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (providing a Rule 11 equivalent in bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
 40. See Hourani v. Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., 
Inc., 757 F.3d 497, 510 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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11(c)(3), on the other hand, courts should apply a standard similar to that used to 
support sanctions for contempt.41 The contempt standard is stricter or more stringent, 
although the precise standard may vary by jurisdiction.42 Regardless, requiring a 
higher standard for sanctions imposed by a court sua sponte under Rule 11(c)(3) 
reduces the risk that by sanctioning a lawyer, a district court will “inadvertently 
dampen attorneys’ legitimate, zealous advocacy on behalf of clients.”43 A stricter 
standard may further be justified on the basis that lawyers tempting sanctions under 
Rule 11(c)(3) do not enjoy the safe harbor provision of Rule 11(c)(2) that would 
otherwise allow them to correct or withdraw the offending papers.44 
Rule 11 grants courts a great deal of flexibility in fashioning sanctions, as 
long as the sanction a court selects is “appropriate” and is “limited to what suffices 
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated.”45 This means that a court should impose the least severe sanction required 
to accomplish Rule 11’s purposes.46 Rule 11(c)(4) expressly provides for alternative 
sanctions, which it refers to as “nonmonetary directives.”47 Courts may, for example, 
order lawyers to participate in CLE programs,48 as they often do, but their creativity 
in crafting appropriate sanctions certainly does not stop there.49 In Curran v. Price,50 
for example, the court was looking to fashion a non-monetary sanction against a 
lawyer, Timothy Umbreit, who tried to remove a case to federal court “that was not 
 
 41. See Muhammad v. Walmart Stores E., 732 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2013); McDonald v. Emory 
Healthcare Eye Ctr., 391 F. App’x 851, 853 (11th Cir. 2010); Stone v. Wolff Props. LLC, 135 F. App’x 
56, 59 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. R&D Latex Corp., 242 F.3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2001)). 
 42. Compare Muhammad, 732 F.3d at 108 (requiring “a finding of subjective bad faith” for 
contempt), with Pousson v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 432, 437 (2009) (concluding that the defendant’s “gross 
negligence and a gross lack of diligence” met the standard for civil contempt). 
 43. Rankin v. City of Niagara Falls, 293 F.R.D. 375, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 44. McDonald, 391 F. App’x at 853; see also In re Nakhuda, 544 B.R. 886, 899–902 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2016) (taking the same approach under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011, the bankruptcy counterpart to FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11). 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1), (4). 
 46. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, Inc., 478 F.3d 255, 265 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thomas 
v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877–78 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). 
 48. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Seavey, 379 F. App’x 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2010) (calling the Rule 11 sanction 
requiring the offending lawyer to attend CLE courses “particularly apropos”); Carlino v. Gloucester City 
High Sch., 44 F. App’x 599, 601–602 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming order under Rule 11 requiring lawyer to 
attend two CLE courses within 18 months in addition to other sanctions); Broussard v. Lafayette Consol. 
Gov’t, Civ. A. No. 6:13-cv-2872, 2015 WL 5025345, at *6–8 (W.D. La. Aug. 20, 2015) (relying on Rule 
11 in ordering the lawyers to complete 21 hours of extra CLE courses); Thomason v. Norman E. Lehrer, 
P.C., 182 F.R.D. 121, 131–32 (D.N.J. 1998) (relying on Rule 11 in ordering the lawyer to complete two 
CLE courses within 18 months); Bullard v. Chrysler Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1180, 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1996) 
(sanctioning the lawyer under Rule 11 and ordering him to take 10 hours of CLE on legal ethics in addition 
to other penalties). 
 49. See JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 16(B)(1), at 270 (“There are few limits placed on judicial creativity 
in fashioning an appropriate sanction.”); see, e.g., Reinhardt v. Gulf Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 405, 417 (1st Cir. 
2007) (affirming the district court’s order that the lawyer perform ten hours of pro bono service as a 
sanction for violating Rule 11). 
 50. 150 F.R.D. 85 (D. Md. 1993). 
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removable under any conceivable notion of federal removal jurisdiction.”51 While 
noting that non-monetary sanctions are intended to be educational,52 the court 
declined to make Umbreit attend a CLE course principally because it doubted that a 
CLE course would fill this gap in his knowledge of federal law.53 Rather: 
[A] more laser-like approach [was] warranted, consisting of 
remedial education in federal removal law, to be gained and 
reinforced through the mnemonic device of copying appropriate 
materials out in longhand. . . . 
 
Specifically . . . Umbreit . . . [was] . . . directed to copy out, 
legibly, in his own handwriting, and within 30 days . . . the text 
(i.e., without footnotes) of section 3722 in 14A C. Wright, A. 
Miller, and E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
(1985), together with the text of that section’s update. . . . Mr. 
Umbreit [was required to] turn in the resulting product to the Clerk 
of this Court, with a certification that it was made solely by himself 
and in his own handwriting. This sanction [was] . . . the least 
drastic—and likely a very effective—way of impressing the 
appropriate principles of federal removal jurisdiction upon 
counsel’s long-term memory.54 
In another Rule 11 alternative sanctions case, Fields v. Gates,55 the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer filed false civil cover sheets in several cases and dismissed another 
case in an attempt to draw a particular judge, which the court and the defendants 
characterized either as forum-shopping or judge-shopping.56 The defendants moved 
for sanctions under Rule 11 and sought to have the case dismissed.57 The court 
instead ordered the plaintiffs’ lawyer to “enroll and attend at an accredited law school 
a full course in ethics and professional responsibility.”58 
B. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Beyond Rule 11 
While Rule 11 and courts’ inherent power are perhaps the most frequently 
cited bases for imposing alternative sanctions, federal courts may also impose 
alternative sanctions on lawyers under various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
 
 
 51. Id. at 85. 
 52. Id. at 86. 
 53. Id. at 87. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 184 F.R.D. 342 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 56. Id. at 344–45. 
 57. Id. at 345. 
 58. Id. 
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1. Rule 16 
The first of these rules is Rule 16, which governs pretrial conferences.59 
Rule 16(f) provides: 
(1) In General. On motion or on its own, the court may issue any 
just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)–
(vii), if a party or its attorney: 
(A) fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial 
conference; 
 
(B) is substantially unprepared to participate—or does 
not participate in good faith—in the conference; or 
 
(C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order. 
 
(2) Imposing Fees and Costs. Instead of or in addition to any other 
sanction, the court must order the party, its attorney, or both to pay 
the reasonable expenses—including attorney’s fees—incurred 
because of any noncompliance with this rule, unless the 
noncompliance was substantially justified or other circumstances 
make an award of expenses unjust.60 
A Rule 16(f) violation does not require a finding of bad faith, although a 
court may consider a lawyer or litigant’s bad faith in settling on an appropriate 
sanction.61 
Rule 16(f) permits courts to impose alternative sanctions on lawyers,62 and 
they freely do so using the rule as authority.63 Petrisch v. JP Morgan Chase64 is an 
illustrative case. In Petrisch, the court relied on Rule 16(f) to sanction the plaintiff’s 
lawyer, Stephen Jackson, for failing to appear for a pretrial conference and for 
violating various scheduling and pretrial orders.65 “To remedy the injury to the 
[c]ourt” for wasting its time, the court ordered Jackson to attend four hours of CLE 
courses on federal practice and procedure within the next year.66 The courses had to 
be approved by state CLE authorities and conducted in a live classroom format, and 
 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 60. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f). 
 61. Hogan v. Raymond Corp., 536 F. App’x 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1) (empowering courts to “issue any just orders” when a party or lawyer 
commits a listed offense); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(2) (providing for the payment of reasonable expenses 
“[i]nstead of or in addition to any other sanction”). 
 63. See, e.g., Burrage-Simon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-cv-00429-GMN-NJK, 2015 
WL 5224885, at *1, *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 8, 2015) (ordering the lawyer to attend an ethics-based CLE course 
in addition to imposing a monetary sanction for violating Rule 16(f) by willfully missing a settlement 
conference). 
 64. 789 F. Supp. 2d 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 65. Id. at 455. 
 66. See id. at 456. 
2017 ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS IN LITIGATION 219 
were to be in addition to those hours required for members of the New York State 
Bar or any other state bar to which Jackson belonged.67 
2. Rule 26 
Next there is Rule 26(g), which governs the signature of Rule 26(a) 
disclosures, and discovery requests, responses, and objections. Rule 26(g) states in 
pertinent part: 
(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure 
under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, 
response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in the attorney’s own name—or by the party personally, if 
unrepresented—and must state the signer’s address, e-mail 
address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party 
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: 
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct 
as of the time it is made; and 
 
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or 
objection, it is: 
 
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, 
or for establishing new law; 
 
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and 
 
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly 
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs 
of the case, prior discovery in the case, the 
amount in controversy, and the importance of 
the issues at stake in the action. 
* * * 
 
(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a certification violates 
this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or 
on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the 
party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction 
may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.68 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
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A lawyer’s certification is tested as of the time the disclosure or discovery 
document was signed.69 Whether a reasonable inquiry has been made is evaluated 
under a standard of objective reasonableness.70 In deciding whether to impose 
sanctions for violating Rule 26(g)(1), “the court must avoid hindsight and resolve all 
doubts in favor of the signer.”71 
Because the imposition of sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) depends on the 
signature of a disclosure or discovery document in violation of Rule 26(g)(1), courts’ 
ability to invoke the rule to remedy litigation misconduct is severely circumscribed.72 
That said, where a lawyer violates Rule 26(g)(1) without substantial justification, the 
court must sanction the lawyer, the party the lawyer represents, or both.73 “Rule 
26(g)(3) gives the judge discretion over the nature of the sanction but not whether to 
impose one.”74 Courts may impose reflective or shaming sanctions on lawyers under 
the rule, as St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp.75 illustrates. 
In St. Paul the defendant, CFC, moved for an expedited trial setting under 
Rule 57 and, in the process, cited a discovery objection by the plaintiffs that allegedly 
evidenced their plan to make the litigation as burdensome as possible for CFC.76 This 
caused the district court to scrutinize the plaintiffs’ discovery objections and it did 
not like what it saw: “In almost every respect . . . each objection asserted by the 
plaintiffs [was] boilerplate, obstructionist, frivolous, overbroad, and, significantly, 
contrary to well-established and long standing federal law.”77 Unwilling to tolerate 
the plaintiffs’ “egregious” discovery abuse, the district court raised the issue of Rule 
26(g) sanctions on its own initiative.78 
After examining several representative improper objections, the court 
turned to Rule 26(g).79 The court determined that the principal signer and exclusive 
draftsman of the plaintiffs’ discovery responses was their out-of-state counsel, and 
concluded that his certification of the objections fell far below any objective standard 
of reasonableness.80 In selecting a sanction, the court noted that while Rule 26(g) 
permitted it to make the lawyer pay CFC’s attorneys’ fees and costs, other sanctions 
were available.81 The court also noted that while the objections were “obstructionist, 
 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“The certification speaks as 
of the time it is made.”); JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 42(C)(2), at 641. 
 70. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., Nos. 96-16770, 96-
16869, 1999 WL 362836, at *1 (9th Cir. June 4, 1999). 
 71. Bergeson v. Dilworth, 749 F. Supp. 1555, 1566 (D. Kan. 1990). 
 72. See McGuire v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-10797, 2015 WL 1757312, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
Apr. 17, 2015) (“A necessary prerequisite to imposing sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3), per the text of the 
rule, is a certification that violates Rule 26(g)(1).”). 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
 74. Rojas v. Town of Cicero, 75 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2015); see also McHugh v. Olympia Entm’t, 
Inc., 37 F. App’x 730, 741 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) are not discretionary if the 
district court finds that a discovery filing was signed in violation of the rule.”). 
 75. 198 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
 76. Id. at 510–11. 
 77. Id. at 511. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 515. 
 80. Id. at 516–17. 
 81. Id. at 516. 
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frivolous and deplorable,” the lawyer’s explanation for them—that he was 
exasperated by the scope of the discovery requests and was surprised by the 
bitterness of the litigation—was “believable, but not justifiable.”82 Thus, rather than 
fining him, the St. Paul court fashioned what it considered to be a lesser sanction: 
[C]ounsel shall . . . write an article explaining why it [was] 
improper to assert the objections that he asserted in this case. 
Counsel shall submit the article to both a New York and Iowa bar 
journal . . . , however, he is not required to mention in the article 
that it was written pursuant to a sanction order. Counsel shall have 
120 days from December 1, 2000, in which to comply with this 
order. In addition, counsel shall submit an affidavit stating that he 
alone researched, wrote, and submitted the article for publication, 
indicating which journals he submitted the article to, as well as 
submitting a copy of the article to this court.83 
Concluding, the court warned the lawyer that failing to prepare the article 
as instructed could result in additional sanctions.84 
3. Rule 30 
Rule 30, which governs depositions by oral examination,85 also provides a 
basis for sanctioning lawyers. Under Rule 30(d)(2), a court “may impose an 
appropriate sanction—including the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees 
incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair 
examination of the deponent.”86 By referring to “a person” when identifying who a 
court may sanction for a violation, Rule 30(d)(2) plainly permits courts to sanction 
lawyers.87 
Unlike sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3), sanctions imposed under Rule 
30(d)(2) are not mandatory; the decision to sanction a violator is entrusted to the 
district court’s discretion.88 A lawyer need not act in bad faith to be sanctioned under 
Rule 30(d)(2).89 Rather, the question for a court considering sanctions under the rule 
 
 82. Id. at 517. 
 83. Id. at 518. 
 84. Id. 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2). 
 87. See Zottola v. Anesthesia Consultants of Savannah, P.C., No. CV411-154, 2012 WL 6824150, at 
*6 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2012) (stating that Rule 30(d)(2) allows for sanctions against lawyers). 
 88. See, e.g., Pain Ctr. of SE Ind., LLC v. Origin Healthcare Sols., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00133-RLY-
DKL, 2015 WL 5775455, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2015) (concluding that Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions were 
not warranted); Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., No. 12cv604-GPC (KSC), 2015 WL 5177760, at *3 (S.D. 
Cal. Sept. 4, 2015) (declining to impose Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions). 
 89. Hylton v. Anytime Towing, No. 11CV1039 JLS (WMc), 2012 WL 3562398, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 
Aug. 17, 2012); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., Civil Action No. 09-2381-JWL-GLR, 2011 
WL 6934112, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 30, 2011) (distinguishing Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions from 28 U.S.C. § 
1927 sanctions); Applebaum v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, No. CV 2007–0916(DLI)(MDG), 2011 WL 
8771843, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011) (differentiating Rule 30(d)(2) from 28 U.S.C. § 1927); GMAC 
Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
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is whether the lawyer’s conduct delayed, frustrated, or impeded the fair examination 
of the deponent.90 Courts may impose Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions sua sponte.91 
While Rule 30(d)(2) permits a court to award an aggrieved party its 
reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees as a sanction for a person’s obstructionist 
behavior in connection with a deposition, that is not the only permissible sanction.92 
This flexibility is apparent from the rule’s (1) reference to “an appropriate 
sanction,”93 and (2) use of the illustrative term “including” to introduce the types of 
sanctions available to courts.94 In short, the rule allows courts to impose reflective 
and shaming sanctions on lawyers for deposition misconduct.95 
4. Rule 37 
Rule 37 permits courts to sanction parties and lawyers for various forms of 
discovery abuse.96 In addition to penalizing misconduct in discovery, sanctions 
imposed under Rule 37 are intended to deter similar misconduct by others, 
compensate the court and affected parties for any expenses attributable to the 
 
 90. See e.g., Applebaum, 2011 WL 8771843, at *6 (quoting the rule and the 1993 advisory committee 
notes); Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01660-GMN-VCF, 2013 WL 5940099, at *1 (D. Nev. 
Nov. 1, 2013) (“First, the court must determine whether a person’s behavior has impeded, delayed, or 
frustrated the fair examination of the deponent.”); Sicurelli v. Jeneric/Pentron, Inc., No. 
03CV4934(SLT)(KAM), 2005 WL 3591701, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2005) (“[F]or purposes of Rule 
[30(d)(2)], a clear showing of bad faith on the part of the attorney against whom sanctions are sought is 
not required. Instead, the imposition of sanctions under Rule [30(d)(2)] requires only that the attorney’s 
conduct frustrated the fair examination of the deponent.”). 
 91. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2015); Tajonera v. Black 
Elk Energy Offshore Operations, L.L.C., Civ. A. Nos. 13-0366 et al., 2015 WL 5178418, at *7 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 3, 2015). 
 92. See, e.g., Claypole v. Cty. of Monterey, Case No. 14-cv-02730-BLF, 2016 WL 145557, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (requiring a lawyer to donate $250 to the Women Lawyers Association of Los 
Angeles as a sanction for a sexist remark directed at opposing counsel during a deposition, as well as 
imposing fees and costs); Carroll v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 12-cv-00007-WJM-KLM, 
2014 WL 859238, at *11 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2014) (striking an expert witness’s testimony and excluding 
him as a Rule 30(d)(2) sanction); Mazzeo v. Gibbons, No. 2:08-cv-01387-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 3020021, 
at *2 (D. Nev. July 27, 2010) (admonishing two lawyers for deposition misconduct and sanctioning them 
by “memorializing their misconduct in this order”). 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2). 
 94. See Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1145, 1150 n.13 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that the term “include” when used to introduce a category, group, or list is intended to be 
illustrative rather than exhaustive or exclusive); Paxson v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 87, 658 N.E.2d 
1309, 1314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“We, too, find the word ‘including’, in its most commonly understood 
meaning, to be a term of enlargement, not of limitation.”); Md. Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co., 30 N.E.3d 
105, 110 (Mass. 2015) (quoting P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 645 F.2d 
1102, 1112 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); Beaver Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc. v. City of Beaver Dam, 2012 WI App 
102, ¶ 14, 344 Wis.2d 278, 822 N.W.2d 491 (adhering to the general rule that “‘include’ is a term of 
illustration or inclusion, not one of limitation or exclusion”). 
 95. See, e.g., Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, Civ. A. Nos. 13-4811, 13-6407, 2015 WL 965976, 
at *11 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2015) (relying on Rule 30(d)(2) in ordering a lawyer to “attend an additional five 
(5) hours of continuing legal education over and above what he is required to attend in Texas, all of which 
must be in the area of professionalism and/or ethics” as a sanction for his “unprofessional personal insults” 
directed at opposing counsel during depositions). 
 96. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 47(A), at 674. 
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offending party’s abuses, and compel compliance with discovery rules.97 Although 
parties are generally the focus of sanctions under Rule 37, lawyers may be sanctioned 
under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) for unjustifiably advising a party not to comply with a 
discovery order,98 under Rule 37(d)(3) for unjustifiably advising a party not to attend 
its own deposition or not to respond to written discovery,99 or under Rule 37(f) for 
failing to participate in good faith in developing and submitting a Rule 26 discovery 
plan.100 Sanctions, however, are limited to the payment of reasonable expenses, 
including attorneys’ fees, attributable to the abuses.101 Alternative sanctions are not 
an option for courts using Rule 37 to remedy misconduct in discovery.102 
C. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
Rules of civil procedure furnish but one source of authority for sanctioning 
lawyers for misconduct in litigation. In federal courts, lawyers may also be 
sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which states: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any 
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct.103 
Unlike Rule 11, § 1927 applies to cases in federal appellate courts as well 
as to district court cases.104 Section 1927, again unlike Rule 11, applies to criminal 
cases as well as to civil matters.105 
A lawyer’s conduct “multiplies proceedings” when it results in proceedings 
that would not have occurred otherwise.106 To be sanctionable under § 1927, a 
lawyer’s conduct must multiply the proceedings “unreasonably and vexatiously.”107 
Courts uniformly reason that bad faith conduct satisfies the vexatiousness 
requirement.108 Reckless conduct will also satisfy the vexatiousness requirement in 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3). 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). 
 102. See, e.g., Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., No. 5:14-CV-05025-LLP, 2015 WL 7274448, at *4 
(D.S.D. Nov. 16, 2015) (declining the plaintiff’s request to require the defendant to produce a discovery 
video as an alternative sanction in part because sanctions were being sought under Rule 37 rather than 
Rule 30). 
 103. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 104. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 21(A)(1), at 427. 
 105. Id. § 21(B), at 431. 
 106. Daniels v. Sodexo, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-00375-T-27AEP, 2013 WL 4008744, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 
5, 2013). 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 108. See, e.g., Boyer v. BNSF Ry. Co., 824 F.3d 694, 708 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that both 
objective and subjective bad faith will support § 1927 sanctions); Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, 
LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring subjective bad faith for sanctions under § 1927); In 
re Prosser, 777 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (“A court imposing § 1927 sanctions must find bad faith, but 
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many jurisdictions,109 regardless of whether it is assessed independently or is 
considered to fall within the definition of “bad faith” in this context.110 Negligent 
conduct, however, will not support sanctions under § 1927.111 
There is a split of authority regarding the reach of § 1927 and, more 
particularly, whether a law firm as compared to an individual lawyer may be 
sanctioned under the statute.112 The statute’s reference to “[a]ny attorney or other 
person admitted to conduct cases in any court” would seem to clearly indicate that 
law firms are not subject to sanctions under § 1927.113 This is the conclusion reached 
by the Sixth,114 Seventh,115 and Ninth Circuits.116 The Fourth Circuit has expressed 
doubt that § 1927 permits sanctions against laws firms, but has not decided the 
issue.117 In contrast, the Second,118 Third,119 Eleventh,120 and District of Columbia121 
Circuits allow law firms to be sanctioned under § 1927. The reasoning of the courts 
 
that finding need not be made explicitly.”); EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 510, 522 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“Bad faith on the part of the attorney is a precondition to imposing fees under § 1927.”); Star Mark 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(requiring bad faith or conduct akin to bad faith for sanctions). 
 109. See, e.g., Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree Partners, L.P., 739 F.3d 848, 871–72 (5th Cir. 
2014) (requiring evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or reckless disregard of the lawyer’s duties to 
the court for sanctions); Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 1992)); Braunstein v. Ariz. 
Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. 
Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010)); Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1202 
(10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that any conduct, viewed objectively, that manifests intentional or reckless 
disregard of a lawyer’s duties to the court, is sanctionable under § 1927). 
 110. See, e.g., Young Apts., Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 503 F. App’x 711, 725 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Bad 
faith is an objective standard that is satisfied when an attorney ‘knowingly or recklessly pursues a frivolous 
claim or engages in litigation tactics that needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous claims.’”) 
(quoting Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007)); Peer v. Lewis, 
606 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Bad faith is an objective standard that is satisfied when an attorney 
knowingly or recklessly pursues a frivolous claim.”). 
 111. Boyer, 824 F.3d at 708; Salkil v. Mount Sterling Twp. Police Dep’t, 458 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 
2006). 
 112. It appears that the Tenth Circuit has yet to address this issue. See Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. 
BrainLab Medizinische Computersystems Gmbh, Civ. A. No. 98-cv-01072-RPM, 2008 WL 410413, at 
*10 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2008) (noting the split of authority on whether § 1927 authorizes fee awards against 
law firms and stating that the Tenth Circuit has not addressed this issue). At least one district court in the 
Tenth Circuit has concluded that law firms may be sanctioned under § 1927, but other district courts in 
the circuit have held that only individual lawyers may be sanctioned. Compare id. (“Liability should be 
borne by the firm. If section 1927 does not support an award of fees against [the law firm] as an entity, 
then such an award is appropriate under the court’s inherent authority.”), with Sangui Biotech Int’l, Inc. 
v. Kappes, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (D. Colo. 2002) (concluding that sanctions under § 1927 may not 
be imposed on law firms). 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 114. BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 115. Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 116. Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 117. Blue v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 549 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 118. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 119. Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 208–212 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 120. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1582 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 121. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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permitting sanctions against law firms under the statute, however, is either suspect 
or non-existent.122 For example, the Second Circuit coarsely reasoned that “[t]here 
is no serious dispute that a court may sanction a law firm pursuant to its inherent 
power. We see no reason that a different rule should apply to § 1927 sanctions, and, 
in any event, we have previously upheld the award of § 1927 sanctions against a law 
firm.”123 But with all due respect to the judges of the Second Circuit, courts’ inherent 
power to sanction is not granted or enforced pursuant to a clear and unambiguous 
statute.124 Different rules may indeed support different approaches,125 and while stare 
decisis is a preferred judicial approach, it “is not an inexorable command.”126 Nor, 
for that matter, is there any need to extend § 1927 to law firms when a court may 
invoke its inherent power to sanction a law firm for the same type of conduct that is 
punishable under the statute.127 
The plain text of § 1927 indicates that it provides no basis for alternative 
sanctions; only monetary penalties are available under the statute and even those are 
limited to the excess costs, expenses, and fees incurred by virtue of the lawyer’s 
wrongful multiplication of the proceedings.128 At least one court, however, arguably 
appears to have relied on § 1927 in imposing alternative sanctions. In Moser v. Bret 
Harte Union High School District,129 the court sanctioned a lawyer defending the 
school district in an education law case for multiple misstatements, 
mischaracterizations and misrepresentations in summary judgment briefing, many 
frivolous objections in summary judgment briefing, and personal attacks on the 
plaintiff and his lawyer.130 The “only reasonable inference” to be drawn, the court 
concluded, was that the lawyer, Elaine Yama, and her law firm “intended to obstruct 
at every step and stand education law on its head.”131 As for the sanction: 
Under FRCP Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court’s inherent 
powers, Ms. Yama is ordered to personally pay Plaintiff and his 
counsel $5,000 for the increased costs and expenses related to 
causing Plaintiff’s need to repeatedly respond to Defendant’s 
blatant misrepresentations, throughout the four year history of this 
litigation; Ms. Yama is PUBLICALLY REPROVED and ordered 
to attend 20 hours of CLE ethics training in programs approved by 
 
 122. See, e.g., id. at 904–907 (failing even to discuss the effect of the limiting “[a]ny attorney or other 
person admitted to conduct cases in any court” language). 
 123. Enmon, 675 F.3d at 147. 
 124. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 630–31 (1962)). 
 125. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (authorizing courts to impose appropriate sanctions on law 
firms), with cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (authorizing monetary sanctions against “[a]ny attorney or other 
person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory”). 
 126. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
 127. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 21(C)(2), at 435–36. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 129. 366 F. Supp. 2d 944 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
 130. Id. at 953–76. 
 131. Id. at 976. 
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the California State Bar Association . . . and must submit proof of 
such training to the Court. . . . 132 
Unfortunately, the opinion is unclear. One possible interpretation of this 
language is that the court imposed all three sanctions on Yama (excess costs and 
expenses, public reproval, and mandatory CLE) under each of the three sources of 
authority it cited: Rule 11, § 1927, and its inherent powers. Another possible reading 
is that the court publicly reproved Yama and ordered her to attend CLE courses under 
either Rule 11 or its inherent powers or both, and assessed excess costs and expenses 
against her under § 1927. The second alternative is preferable because the court 
would then be properly applying the statute, but that interpretation is by no means 
certain. In any event, the opinion’s ambiguity coupled with the plain statutory 
language robs Moser of any persuasive value in advocating for alternative sanctions 
under § 1927. Moser certainly has no precedential value.133 
D. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 
Although most lawyers think of sanctions as a trial court peril, appellate 
courts may also impose sanctions, as we saw in the discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.134 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides another basis for appellate 
sanctions. Rule 38 states that “[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is 
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and 
reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to 
the appellee.”135 Sanctions for pursuing a frivolous appeal are discretionary with the 
appellate court—not mandatory.136 An appeal is frivolous for purposes of the rule 
when “‘the result is obvious or when the appellant’s argument is wholly without 
merit.’”137 Sanctions may also lie where an appeal is filed for improper purposes or 
the appellant makes only cursory arguments.138 
Rule 38 is silent as to the possible targets of sanctions, but it is clear that 
courts may rely on it to sanction lawyers.139 It is equally clear from the language of 
the rule that any sanctions must be monetary—alternative sanctions are not an option 
for courts. 
 
 132. Id. at 988. 
 133. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with characteristic 
bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”). 
 134. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 135. FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
 136. Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 137. Duff v. Cent. Sleep Diagnostics, LLC, 801 F.3d 833, 844 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting McCoy v. 
Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 769 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2014)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 757 F.3d 695, 700–701 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Rule 38 allows us to impose 
sanctions against an appellant or an appellant’s attorney.”); Ransmeier v. Mariani, 718 F.3d 64, 69 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled that an attorney’s conduct on appeal as well as the arguments he makes may 
expose him to sanctions both under our inherent power and under the proscriptions of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.”). 
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E. Courts’ Inherent Power to Sanction 
Courts’ ability to sanction lawyers and parties for misconduct in litigation 
extends beyond the authority granted by procedural rules and statutes.140 Courts may 
also sanction lawyers and parties pursuant to their inherent power to regulate the 
conduct of those who appear before them.141 This is true of federal142 and state143 
courts alike. Courts’ inherent power to sanction lawyers and parties to vindicate their 
authority exists separate and apart from their power of contempt.144 
Courts must exercise caution and restraint when exercising their inherent 
powers.145 At a minimum, a court considering sanctions under its inherent power 
must ensure that it understands the facts and law underpinning its decision.146 
Inherent power sanctions are generally justified only where the offender (1) willfully 
disobeys a court order;147 or (2) acts in bad faith.148 But while the willful 
 
 140. See Parsi v. Daioleslam, 778 F.3d 116, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (observing that “[i]n addition to 
sanctions contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” courts possess “an inherent power at 
common law” to impose sanctions). 
 141. See Sciarretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Courts have 
the inherent power to police themselves and those appearing before them.”); Ransmeier, 718 F.3d at 68 
(“Our authority to impose sanctions is grounded, first and foremost, in our inherent power to control the 
proceedings that take place before this [c]ourt.”); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1475 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (stating that a court may sanction both lawyers and parties pursuant to its inherent powers); 
Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1411 (5th Cir. 1993) (saying “there 
is no doubt” that courts may sanction lawyers under their inherent powers); Tom v. S.B., Inc., 280 F.R.D. 
603, 610 (D.N.M. 2012) (observing that “courts have an inherent power to sanction attorneys and 
parties”). 
 142. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–44 (1991). 
 143. Rush v. Burdge, 141 So. 3d 764, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); In re Estate of Weatherbee, 2014 
ME 73, ¶ 9, 93 A.3d 248, 253; Wong v. Luu, 34 N.E.3d 35, 44–45 (Mass. 2015); Maldonado v. Ford 
Motor Co., 719 N.W.2d 809, 810 (Mich. 2006); A.J.H. ex rel. M.J.H. v. M.A.H.S., 364 S.W.3d 680, 682 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 951 A.2d 947, 967 (N.J. 2008); State ex rel. King 
v. Advantageous Cmty. Servs., LLC, 2014-NMCA-076, ¶ 12, 329 P.3d 738, 741; Supplee v. Miller-Motte 
Bus. Coll., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 582, 600 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting In re Small, 689 S.E.2d 482, 485 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009)); Utz v. McKenzie, 397 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. App. 2013); Maxwell v. Woodall, 
2014 UT App 125, ¶ 5–11, 328 P.3d 869, 871–74; Env’t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Nw., N.A., 
782 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Va. 2016) (citing and discussing Nusbaum v. Berlin, 641 S.E.2d 494, 501–502 (Va. 
2007)); State v. Merrill, 335 P.3d 444, 447 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
 144. See In re Charbono, 790 F.3d 80, 86 (1st Cir. 2015) (“The courts of appeals, too, have recognized 
the authority of federal courts to impose inherent-power sanctions without a finding of contempt.”). 
 145. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50; Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 662 (7th Cir. 2012); Wong, 34 
N.E.3d at 45. 
 146. Trade Well Int’l v. United Cent. Bank, 778 F.3d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 147. Id. at 627 (stating that “sanctions under the court’s inherent power should not be imposed unless 
there is bad-faith conduct or willful disobedience of an order”); Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 
688 F.3d 1015, 1035 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] district court has the inherent power to sanction for: (1) willful 
violation of a court order; or (2) bad faith. A determination that a party was willfully disobedient is 
different from a finding that a party acted in bad faith. Either supports the imposition of sanctions.”). 
 148. In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2016); Williamson v. Recovery Ltd., 826 F.3d 297, 302 
(6th Cir. 2016); Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.3d 1122, 1132–34 (9th Cir. 2015), 
amended by 813 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2016); Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 1205, 1212 
(11th Cir. 2015); Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer 
v. Banco Popular of N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 2015)); Trade Well Int’l, 778 F.3d at 627; 
Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Rush, 141 So. 3d at 766; Gap v. Puna Geothermal 
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disobedience of a court order is easily evaluated, there is no precise litmus test for 
determining what sort of conduct by lawyers or litigants constitutes bad faith.149 
Rather, “bad faith” describes “a broad range of willful improper conduct.”150 It is 
clear, however, that mere negligence will not suffice.151 
In some jurisdictions, a lawyer may face inherent power sanctions absent a 
finding of bad faith.152 As the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Seltzer,153 
courts’ inherent power “includes the power to police the conduct of attorneys as 
officers of the court, and to sanction attorneys for conduct not inherent to client 
representation, such as, violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes 
with the court’s power to manage its calendar and the courtroom without a finding 
of bad faith.”154   
Courts may impose inherent power sanctions sua sponte.155 A court may 
invoke its inherent power to sanction a lawyer or party even where the misconduct 
is sanctionable under a rule or statute.156 Where a lawyer’s or party’s misconduct is 
sanctionable under a rule or statute, however, a court ordinarily should rely on that 
authority instead of resorting to its inherent power.157 When a court relies on its 
inherent power to sanction a lawyer or party rather than leaning on an applicable rule 
or statute, it should explain why the rule or statute was inadequate under the 
circumstances.158 
Courts’ inherent power certainly includes the power to craft alternative 
sanctions.159 In fact, courts regularly employ their inherent powers to fashion 
 
Venture, 104 P.3d 912, 921 (Haw. 2004) (quoting Bank of Haw. v. Kunimoto, 984 P.2d 1198, 1215 (Haw. 
1999)); In re Estate of Weatherbee, 2014 ME 73, ¶ 17; A.J.H. ex rel. M.J.H., 364 S.W.3d at 682; Merrill, 
335 P.3d at 447. But see Wong, 34 N.E.3d at 44 (reasoning that “‘bad faith’ alone is too vague a standard 
to establish the scope of a judge’s inherent power to assess attorney’s fees against an attorney who is not 
in violation of a court order, statute, or rule of procedure”). 
 149. Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 150. Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 151. Trade Well Int’l, 778 F.3d at 627; Grochocinski, 719 F.3d at 799. 
 152. See, e.g., In re Charbono, 790 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2015) (asserting that “where an inherent-
power sanction does not take the form of an award of attorneys’ fees (and thus does not involve a departure 
from the American Rule), a finding of bad faith is not ordinarily required”); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “a finding of bad faith is not always necessary to 
the court’s exercise of its inherent power to impose sanctions”). 
 153. 227 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 154. Id. at 42. 
 155. Projects Mgmt. Co. v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 375 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 156. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991). 
 157. Id. at 50. 
 158. See United States v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing the district 
court’s reliance on its inherent power rather than on Rule 11). 
 159. See Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.3d 1122, 1141 (9th Cir. 2015), amended by 
813 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Courts have the inherent power to impose various non-monetary 
sanctions.”). 
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reflective and shaming sanctions against lawyers.160 In Hardy v. Asture,161 for 
example, the court determined that the lawyer’s repeated refusal to comply with 
procedural requirements and serial failures to exercise legal judgment in a social 
security case were clearly willful and demonstrated bad faith, and accordingly 
warranted inherent power sanctions.162 The court therefore ordered the lawyer to 
attend eight hours of CLE courses on social security litigation in federal court 
conducted in a live classroom format in the next six months.163 In Davis v. West Los 
Angeles Travelodge,164 the court invoked its inherent power to sanction a defense 
lawyer who repeatedly behaved disrespectfully and unprofessionally toward the 
plaintiff’s lawyer, who required a service dog.165 The court ordered the lawyer to 
complete 20 hours of continuing legal education on civility and professionalism, and 
to perform 30 hours of volunteer work with a disability rights organization.166 In 
Glucksberg v. Polan,167 Scott Andrews, a lawyer representing the defendants, did not 
promptly reveal that one of his clients had died.168 Relying on its inherent power, the 
West Virginia federal court hearing the matter sanctioned Andrews by ordering him 
to: 
[R]esearch, write, and submit to the court an article explaining: (1) 
the proper course for a lawyer to follow, under West Virginia and 
federal law, in the event that the lawyer’s client dies during the 
course of representation, including the necessary notification of 
the court and of other parties to the proceeding, investigation of 
the status and proper representation of the estate, and any possible 
notices or motions to be filed in court; (2) the possible adverse 
consequences that can flow from failing to scrupulously follow 
these procedures; and (3) the general rules in West Virginia for the 
appointment of an administrator or executor to an estate and the 
 
 160. See, e.g., Armstead v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 1:14-cv-586-WSD, 2016 WL 7093903, at 
*6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2016) (ordering the lawyer to write a 5,000 word or longer article for two state bar 
journals “discussing the practical and legal consequences of failing to be candid with the court and failing 
to comply with court rules and orders”); In re Parker, Civ. A. No. 3:14cv241, 2014 WL 4809844, at *6 
(E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2014) (upholding a bankruptcy court’s use of its inherent power to sanction a lawyer 
by requiring him to attend 12 hours of CLE courses on bankruptcy law and ethics in addition to other 
penalties); In re Aleman, Case No. 14-00606-TLM, 2015 WL 1956271, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Apr. 29, 
2015) (relying on its inherent authority to order the lawyer to obtain six CLE credits within the next six 
months); In re Varan, No. 11 B 44072, 2014 WL 2881162, at *14–15 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 24, 2014) 
(reasoning that because the offending lawyers’ experience as practitioners and apparent participation in 
Illinois mandatory CLE did not deter their serious misconduct, completion of a law school course on 
professional responsibility was required). 
 161. Civ. No. 1:11cv299, 2013 WL 566020 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2013). 
 162. Id. at *7. 
 163. Id. at *8. 
 164. No. CV 08-8279 CBM (CTx), 2010 WL 623657 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010). 
 165. Id. at *1–2. 
 166. Id. at *1. 
 167. No. Civ.A. 3:99-0129, 2003 WL 24221184 (S.D. W. Va. June 12, 2003). 
 168. Id. at *1. 
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capacity or incapacity of estate representatives to sue or be sued in 
West Virginia.169 
Interestingly, this sanction was proposed by the lawyer representing 
Andrews at the show cause hearing in the case—presumably in an effort to avoid 
monetary sanctions or some other possible penalty believed to be more serious.170 
Andrews’s lawyer also told the court at the final show cause hearing that he had 
required Andrews to do all of the legal research required to prepare for the hearing,171 
surely again with mitigation in mind. 
F. Summary 
Depending on the case and jurisdiction, courts may sanction lawyers under 
rules of civil procedure, rules of appellate procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and their 
inherent powers. A court contemplating sanctions must afford the targeted lawyer 
due process, meaning notice that sanctions are a possibility and an opportunity to be 
heard on the issue.172 This is true in state courts as well as federal courts.173 More 
particularly, “notice” in this context requires the court to inform the lawyer of the 
source of authority for the possible sanctions and the specific conduct under scrutiny 
so that the lawyer can mount a defense.174 If especially severe sanctions are being 
contemplated, particularized notice of the nature of the sanction may be required.175 
What constitutes an opportunity to be heard will vary by case.176 A court is not 
necessarily required to hold an evidentiary hearing or hear oral argument; in some 
situations, briefing may be sufficient for the court to rule.177 
Lawyers who are threatened with possible sanctions are wise to devote 
significant effort to defeating them in the trial court. Losing at the trial court level 
substantially lessens a lawyer’s chances for vindication because appellate courts 
generally review trial courts’ sanctions orders for abuse of discretion.178 Although 
this is not an insurmountable hurdle for a sanctioned lawyer to overcome, it certainly 
is an unfavorable standard of review, as any experienced appellate advocate will 
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 171. Id. 
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 174. Martin v. Giordano, 11-CV-4507 (ARR) (JO), 2016 WL 4411401,at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2016) 
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v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rogers Cartage Co., 794 F.3d 854, 862 
(7th Cir. 2015); Ek v. Boggs, 75 P.3d 1180, 1190 (Haw. 2003); Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
235 P.3d 592, 596 (Nev. 2010); Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014); Ragland 
v. Soggin, 784 S.E.2d 698, 701 (Va. 2016). 
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attest.179 Even assuming that a trial court’s discretion narrows as the severity of a 
possible sanction increases or where the court entertains the possibility of sanctions 
on its own,180 the abuse of discretion standard still requires the appellate court to 
affirm the trial court unless it (1) acted arbitrarily; (2) made an error of law; or (3) 
relied on clearly erroneous factual findings.181 Plus, where a trial court sanctions a 
lawyer based on more than one source of authority—such as a rule of civil procedure 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1987, or a rule and the court’s inherent power—the lawyer must 
prevail across the board on appeal; if an appellate court can affirm a sanction on any 
basis it generally will do so.182 This is true even where the trial court cites incorrect 
authority as the sole basis for imposing sanctions.183 
III. ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT 
Now with an essential understanding of the sanctions framework, we return 
to what must be considered the leading alternative sanctions case, styled as Security 
National Bank of Sioux City v. Abbott Laboratories184 at the district court level and 
as Security Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day185 on appeal. This Part will examine 
the district and appellate court decisions, and then analyze the case and alternative 
sanctions from a broader perspective. In doing so, it refers to both the district court 
and Eighth Circuit decisions by the shorthand title Security National Bank of Sioux 
City. 
 
 179. See Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l Hepa Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 391 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating 
that the abuse of discretion standard of review is “‘not appellant-friendly’”) (quoting Jensen v. Phillips 
Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2011)); Gallego v. Northland Grp. Inc., 814 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 
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on an erroneous conclusion of law, (2) the district court’s factual findings are clearly in error, or (3) the 
district court’s decision is, when taken as a whole, ‘clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.’”) (quoting 
Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 343 (6th Cir.2002)). 
 182. See, e.g., Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 617 F.3d 843, 857 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “although 
the district court erred in invoking Rule 11, we uphold its entry of sanctions against defense counsel under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the district court’s inherent power”); see also 
Balerna v. Gilberti, 708 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that while Rule 11(b) sanctions were 
improper, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to invoke its inherent power 
to discipline the lawyer, so the lawyer was not prejudiced by the district court’s reliance on Rule 11(b)). 
 183. See Isaacson v. Manty, 721 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Even where a court cites incorrect 
authority as the basis for contempt sanctions, we may consider alternative grounds for the imposition of 
those sanctions, so long as the court could have sanctioned the same conduct under another source of 
authority, the court’s findings are adequate to meet the applicable standard, and the contemnor’s due 
process rights are protected.”). 
 184. 299 F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones 
Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 185. 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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A. The District Court Decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City 
Security National Bank of Sioux City began as a product liability action. 
Security National Bank, as conservator for a child, J.M.K., sued Abbott Laboratories, 
the maker of baby formula that was allegedly contaminated by dangerous bacteria.186 
J.M.K. allegedly suffered brain damage from consuming the tainted formula.187 
Abbott ultimately won the case at trial.188 In preparing for trial, however, the parties 
filed deposition designations and objections to designations, and thus the district 
court read deposition transcripts of several witnesses.189 On the third day of trial, 
District Judge Mark W. Bennett, acting sua sponte, entered an order directing one of 
Abbott’s counsel from the respected global law firm of Jones Day to show cause why 
she should not be sanctioned for a pattern of obstructionist behavior during 
depositions.190 Retreating a bit out of the concern that he should not burden the Jones 
Day lawyers with the distraction of a sanctions hearing mid-trial, Judge Bennett 
decided to table any sanctions debate until the trial concluded.191 Thus, the same day 
he entered judgment in Abbott’s favor, he entered a supplemental show cause order 
directing the Jones Day lawyer to address three classes of deposition conduct that 
potentially warranted sanctions: (1) excessive use of “form” objections when 
defending depositions; (2) numerous attempts to coach witnesses when defending 
depositions; and (3) frequent interruptions and purported attempts to clarify 
questions by the plaintiff’s counsel during depositions.192 Although he did not name 
her in the opinion, Judge Bennett focused his ire on the conduct of Jones Day partner 
June Ghezzi, an accomplished trial lawyer with an unblemished professional 
record.193 
1. “Form” Objections 
With respect to “form” objections, the district court focused on two 
depositions in which Ghezzi posed “form” objections at least 115 times.194 In other 
words, rather than objecting to questions on specific bases related to their form, such 
as being leading or compound, or assuming facts not in evidence,195 Ghezzi “simply 
objected to ‘form,’” requiring the plaintiff’s lawyer and anyone reading the 
deposition transcript to guess the basis for the objection.196 As the court saw it, 
Ghezzi also used “form” objections to nitpick the examiner’s word choices in what 
the court characterized as efforts to influence the witness’s answer, to “voice 
absurdly hyper-technical truths,” and to invent “novel objections” devoid of legal 
 
 186. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 598. 
 187. Id. 
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 189. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 800 F.3d at 939. 
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 194. See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 600. 
 195. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR, 2012 WL 28071, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 
2012) (offering examples of form objections). 
 196. Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, 299 F.R.D. at 600. 
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basis.197 In any event, the court observed, her “form” objections “rarely, if ever, 
followed a truly objectionable question.”198 
Judge Bennett explained his reasons for believing that “form” objections to 
questions are impermissible: 
[O]bjecting to “form” is like objecting to “improper”—it does no 
more than vaguely suggest that the objector takes issue with the 
question. It is not itself a ground for objection, nor does it preserve 
any objection. Instead, “form” objections refer to a category of 
objections, which includes objections to “leading questions, lack 
of foundation, assuming facts not in evidence, mischaracterization 
or misleading question, non-responsive answer, lack of personal 
knowledge, testimony by counsel, speculation, asked and 
answered, argumentative question, and witness’ answers that were 
beyond the scope of the question.”199 
In addition to being useless because they obliquely refer to any number of 
possible bases for objection, “form” objections are inefficient and frustrate the goals 
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.200 
The Rules contemplate that objections should be concise and 
afford the examiner the opportunity to cure the objection. . . . 
While unspecified “form” objections are certainly concise, they do 
nothing to alert the examiner to a question’s alleged defect. 
Because they lack specificity, “form” objections do not allow the 
examiner to immediately cure the objection. Instead, the examiner 
must ask the objector to clarify, which takes more time and 
increases the amount of objection banter between the lawyers. 
Briefly stating the particular ground for the objection, on the other 
hand, is no less concise and allows the examiner to ask a remedial 
question without further clarification.201 
Finally, it is difficult for courts to evaluate the validity of “form” 
objections.202 A court asked to rule on “form” objections must speculate about the 
bases for them.203 That is reason enough to require lawyers to specify the grounds 
for their objections.204 
Interestingly, after explaining at length why “form” objections are 
improper, Judge Bennett noted that not all courts share his dislike for them and some 
courts even require lawyers to assert only unspecified “form” objections in 
depositions.205 Consequently, Judge Bennett declined to sanction Ghezzi merely for 
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asserting “form” objections.206 But Ghezzi’s use of “form” objections highlighted 
two other concerns: witness coaching and excessive deposition interruptions.207 
Judge Bennett was willing to sanction Ghezzi for using form objections as a means 
of coaching witnesses and as a tactic to interrupt depositions.208 
2. Witness Coaching 
Moving on to the problem of witness coaching, Judge Bennett observed that 
while some courts approve of “form” objections, they consistently prohibit lawyers 
from coaching witnesses during depositions.209 Lawyers may not comment on 
questions in ways that might influence witnesses’ answers.210 In this case, Ghezzi 
made numerous “‘clarification-inducing’ objections—objections that prompted the 
witnesses to request that the examiner clarify otherwise cogent questions.”211 After 
listening to Ghezzi’s objection, the witness would ask the plaintiff’s lawyer to clarify 
an easily understandable question or even refuse to answer the question.212 Judge 
Bennett recited several examples from the transcripts he read.213 Here was one: 
Q. Well, if there were high numbers of OAL, Eb samples in the 
factory, wouldn’t that be a cause for concern about the 
microbiological quality of the finished product? 
 
COUNSEL: Object to the form of the question. It’s a hypothetical; 
lacks facts. 
 
A. Yeah, those are hypotheticals. 
 
. . . 
 
Q. Would that be a concern of yours? 
 
COUNSEL: Same objection. 
 
A. Not going to answer. 
 
Q. You’re not going to answer? 
 
A. Yeah, I mean, it’s speculation. It would be guessing. 
 
COUNSEL: You don’t have to guess.214 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 603–604. 
 208. Id. at 604. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2) and citing the FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee notes 
to 1993 amendments). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 604–608. 
 214. Id. at 604. 
2017 ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS IN LITIGATION 235 
Judge Bennett was also upset by Ghezzi’s practice of concluding objections 
in ways that suggested to witnesses that they should claim to be incapable of 
answering the question.215 Predictably, the witnesses took the hints.216 For example: 
Q. If it’s high enough to kill bacteria, why does Abbott prior to 
that go through a process of pasteurization? 
 
COUNSEL: If you know, and you’re not a production person so 
don’t feel like you have to guess. 
 
A. I don’t know. 
 
Q. Does it describe the heat treatment that you referred to a few 
moments ago, the heat treatment that occurs in the dryer phase? 
 
. . . 
 
COUNSEL: Okay. Do you know his question? He’s asking you if 
this is what you’re describing. 
 
A. Yeah, I don’t know. 
 
Q. . . . Is there any particular reason that that language is stated 
with respect to powdered infant formula? 
 
COUNSEL: If you know. Don’t—if you know. 
 
A. No, I—no, not to my knowledge. 
 
COUNSEL: If you know. I mean, do you know or not know? 
 
A. I don’t know.217 
In other instances, the court faulted Ghezzi for coaching witnesses to give 
particular answers, reinterpreting or rephrasing the plaintiff’s lawyer’s questions, or 
providing witnesses with additional information to consider when answering 
questions.218 Consider this exchange as an example of conduct the court found to be 
improper: 
Plaintiff’s Counsel: [I]s there something that they . . . just chose 
not to put— 
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Defense Counsel: [S]he didn’t write this. 
 
[Witness]: Yes, I didn’t write this. 
 
Plaintiff’s Counsel: [D]o you know if that test was performed 
in . . . Columbus? 
 
[Witness]: I don’t. 
 
Defense Counsel: Yes, you do. Read it.219 
Ghezzi defended her conduct by arguing that she was simply steering the 
plaintiff’s lawyer “to the correct ground” when he was “on the wrong track factually” 
when deposing Abbott witnesses.220 When examinations of Abbott witnesses 
“bogged down,” she merely “attempted to speed up the process by helping to clarify 
or facilitate things.”221 These arguments did not persuade the court. A lawyer 
defending a deposition is not empowered to decide whether another lawyer is going 
astray or to redirect that lawyer’s questioning to fit the defending lawyer’s view of 
the case.222 Furthermore, the court thought that it was nonsensical to suggest that 
Ghezzi’s running commentary hastened the depositions.223 Her comments were 
framed as objections—they were not well-intentioned efforts to clarify questions.224 
In summary, Ghezzi’s perceived witness coaching was sanctionable.225 
3. Excessive Interruptions 
Beyond Ghezzi’s use of objections to coach Abbott witnesses, the court 
believed that she excessively interrupted the depositions she defended.226 In 
discussing her “grossly excessive” interruptions, the court noted that (a) in one 
deposition, her name appeared in the transcript 92 times, or roughly once per page; 
(b) in another deposition, her name appeared in the transcript 381 times, or 
approximately three times per page; and (c) her name appeared with similar 
frequency in the transcripts of the other depositions she defended.227 And, as noted 
earlier, the court considered almost all of her objections and interruptions to be 
improper.228 Because Ghezzi’s objections and interruptions delayed, frustrated, and 
impeded the fair examinations of the witnesses being deposed, they provided an 
independent basis for sanctions.229 
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4. The Show Cause Hearing and Sanctions 
After receiving two responses from Jones Day to his supplemental show 
cause order, Judge Bennett conducted a telephonic hearing.230 During that hearing, 
he asked Ghezzi to “follow up with an e-mail message suggesting an appropriate 
sanction” should he decide to sanction her.231 Judge Bennett did not indicate the types 
of sanctions he was considering.232 A few days later, another Jones Day partner 
responded with an e-mail message urging the court not to impose sanctions and 
declining to suggest a possible sanction.233 
Judge Bennett entered his sanctions order one week later. He explained that 
while he had the discretion to impose substantial monetary sanctions on Ghezzi, he 
was more interested in reforming her deposition practices.234 He was also deeply 
committed to deterring similar behavior by other lawyers because “so many litigators 
are trained to make obstructionist objections.”235 He therefore settled on an “outside-
the-box” sanction designed for deterrent and reformative effect:236 
Counsel must write and produce a training video in which Counsel, 
or another partner in Counsel’s firm, appears and explains the 
holding and rationale of this opinion, and provides specific steps 
lawyers must take to comply with its rationale in future depositions 
in any federal and state court. The video must specifically address 
the impropriety of unspecified “form” objections, witness 
coaching, and excessive interruptions. The lawyer appearing in the 
video may mention the few jurisdictions that actually require only 
unspecified “form” objections and may suggest that such 
objections are proper in only those jurisdictions. The lawyer in the 
video must state that the video is being produced and distributed 
pursuant to a federal court’s sanction order regarding a partner in 
the firm, but the lawyer need not state the name of the partner, the 
case the sanctions arose under, or the court issuing this order. Upon 
completing the video, Counsel must file it with this court, under 
seal, for my review and approval. If and when I approve the video, 
Counsel must (1) notify certain lawyers at Counsel’s firm about 
the video via e-mail and (2) provide those lawyers with access to 
the video. The lawyers who must receive this notice and access 
include each lawyer at Counsel’s firm . . . who engages in federal 
or state litigation or who works in any practice group in which at 
least two of the lawyers have filed an appearance in any state or 
federal case in the United States.237 
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Judge Bennett explained that he would never have acted sua sponte had 
Ghezzi’s conduct generally been appropriate.238 Depositions can be brutal, and even 
good lawyers occasionally object improperly.239 Ghezzi unquestionably was a fine 
lawyer; indeed, the judge praised her superior performance at trial.240 But her 
excellent trial work did not excuse her deposition conduct.241 Because her improper 
deposition tactics “went far beyond what judges should tolerate of any lawyer,” 
sanctions were required.242 
In conclusion, Judge Bennett indicated that he would automatically stay the 
order pending any appeal.243 As expected, Ghezzi and Jones Day appealed.244 
Security National Bank chose not to submit a brief on appeal, but five amici 
submitted briefs in support of the district court.245 
B. The Eighth Circuit Decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City 
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the district court had 
sanctioned Ghezzi under Rule 30(d)(2) and stating that it reviews orders imposing 
sanctions under Rule 30(d)(2) for abuse of discretion.246 A district court’s discretion 
constricts as the severity of the chosen sanction increases or when it imposes 
sanctions on its own.247 When a district court imposes sanctions sua sponte or when 
the sanction it selects is harsher than most, a reviewing court applies the abuse of 
discretion standard with special rigor.248 
Ghezzi and Jones Day contended that Rule 30(d)(2) did not empower the 
district court to impose sanctions on its own, but the Eighth Circuit succinctly 
declined to so limit the court’s power.249 Even if the lawyers in a case choose to 
ignore discovery violations, courts may still impose Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions on their 
own to deter ongoing and future misconduct.250 “Both the plain language and purpose 
of Rule 30(d)(2) authorize courts to impose sanctions sua sponte.”251 
The Eighth Circuit was bothered by the timing of the sanctions order, 
however. Judge Bennett did not assume responsibility for the Security National Bank 
of Sioux City case until 16 months after the depositions in which Ghezzi’s most 
offensive conduct took place and one year after discovery closed.252 He did not 
impose sanctions until some seven months later, meaning that Ghezzi was sanctioned 
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almost two years after she had defended the subject depositions without a peep from 
the plaintiff’s lawyer.253 As the court explained: 
With few exceptions, sanctions should be imposed “within a time 
frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred.” . . . 
Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions assessed near the time of violation deter 
both ongoing and subsequent abuses. . . . Prompt action “helps 
enhance the credibility of the rule,” and by deterring further 
discovery abuse, “achieve its therapeutic purpose.” . . . This is 
especially true when sanctions are imposed sua sponte after the 
fact, for delay allows potential violations to pass unchecked and 
undeterred. . . . The primary purpose of Rule 30(d)(2) was not well 
served by the post hoc procedures here.254 
Moreover, Judge Bennett gave Ghezzi no advance notice of the type of 
sanction he was considering.255 Neither the original show cause order nor the 
supplemental show cause order signaled the court’s intent to impose the unusual 
sanction selected.256 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that before “imposing the ‘most severe 
sanctions,’” a district court should give the target lawyer “‘clear notice’ as to the 
form of the sanction.”257 Particularized notice of the sanction being considered may 
be especially important where a lawyer’s reputation may be affected by the sanction 
given the symbolic statement that sanctions may make about a lawyer’s integrity or 
the quality of her work.258 A lawyer’s opportunity to be heard is of diminished value 
without notice of the nature of a potential sanction, because the lawyer needs that 
information to thoughtfully respond.259 
In this case, Ghezzi had no appreciable notice of the sanction the district 
court was contemplating.260 Although Judge Bennett gave Ghezzi and Jones Day 
advance notice of his reasons for considering Rule 30(d)(2) sanctions, he never 
indicated in his show cause orders or during the hearing that producing and 
distributing an instructional video on deposition misconduct was in the cards.261 The 
unusual shaming sanction was revealed for the first time in the district court’s 
published opinion.262  
The Eighth Circuit explained that once information about an extraordinary 
litigation sanction is publicized, damage to the lawyer’s career, reputation, and future 
professional opportunities may be hard to repair and might even be irreparable.263 
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Recognizing the importance to Ghezzi of her professional reputation, the court 
considered the possibility that Judge Bennett’s shaming sanction could indelibly 
stain her career.264 Given the professional stakes, she was entitled to particularized 
notice of the nature of the sanction Judge Bennett was considering so that she could 
meaningfully respond to the show cause orders.265 
In coming to a decision, the Eighth Circuit noted that it could vacate the 
sanctions order and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.266 
But it saw little value in that approach because Ghezzi had already been significantly 
punished by virtue of having endure the sanctions process and litigation, and 
additional sanctions proceedings so long after the challenged conduct took place 
would not serve the deterrent purpose of Rule 30(d)(2).267 The court therefore 
reversed the district court’s sanctions order.268 
C. Analysis: Security National Bank of Sioux City and Beyond 
Although Jones Day and Ghezzi were surely gratified by the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Security National Bank of Sioux City, lawyers should not read 
the case too expansively. The Eighth Circuit did not endorse Ghezzi’s conduct.269 
More to the immediate point, the court did not condemn or invalidate reflective or 
shaming sanctions. To the contrary, the opinion can be read to suggest that the Eighth 
Circuit would have upheld the district court’s shaming sanction had the district court 
acted sooner and given Ghezzi particularized notice of the sanction it was 
considering. The sanction might also have been affirmed had the plaintiff timely 
moved for sanctions rather than the district court raising the possibility of sanctions 
on its own at trial.270 
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit’s decision is incompletely reasoned. First, 
the court seemingly faulted the district court for not holding a Rule 16 conference in 
the discovery phase of the case which supposedly would have allowed Judge Bennett 
(or the magistrate judge or senior district judge on the case earlier) to learn whether 
there were problems to address.271 Of course, the district court could have learned of 
Ghezzi’s offending conduct at a Rule 16 conference only if the plaintiff’s lawyer 
raised it and the plaintiff’s lawyer never complained about her conduct at any point 
in the case.272 There is no reason to believe based on the facts in the opinion that the 
plaintiff’s lawyer would have complained had he been forced to appear for a status 
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conference at some point during discovery. The lack of a Rule 16 conference was 
therefore irrelevant. 
Second, the Eighth Circuit’s criticism of the delay between Ghezzi’s 
deposition conduct and Judge Bennett’s expression of concern about it was 
exaggerated. Although it is preferable for deterrence purposes for sanctions to be 
“imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be 
deterred,”273 a court’s failure to sanction a lawyer at the earliest possible time does 
not operate to pardon the lawyer’s misbehavior.274 Indeed, district courts may 
consider collateral issues such as sanctions even after a case has been voluntarily 
dismissed.275 
This was not a case like In re Yagman,276 where the district court waited 
until the conclusion of the case to suggest Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff’s 
lawyer for filing the lawsuit.277 In Security National Bank of Sioux City, the parties 
filed their deposition designations and objections in preparation for a January 6, 2014 
trial, thus presenting Judge Bennett with a record of Ghezzi’s behavior very late in 
the game; Judge Bennett overruled Abbott’s objections to the plaintiff’s deposition 
designations on December 30, 2013, in the process expressing his unhappiness with 
them; he issued his first show cause order on January 9, 2014; and he issued his 
supplemental show cause order on January 21, 2014, the day he entered judgment 
for Abbott.278 That is a relatively compressed time frame. The fact that the district 
court did not hold a sanctions hearing until July 17, 2014, was due in substantial part 
to Jones Day obtaining extensions of time to respond to the supplemental show cause 
order and later obtaining a continuance of the hearing.279 In fact, reserving a decision 
on sanctions until the end of trial is sometimes appropriate because, “[i]n some 
situations, liability under proper sanctioning authority will not be immediately 
apparent or may not be precisely and accurately discernible until a later time.”280 
Third, while Judge Bennett should have given Ghezzi notice of the 
sanctions he was considering, it is questionable whether his failure to do so was 
consequential. When he asked Ghezzi to suggest an appropriate sanction should he 
decide to go that route, Jones Day declined to propose a sanction.281 Jones Day took 
that approach even though the firm must have known that Judge Bennett might be 
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weighing a shaming sanction. Assuming that the excellent Jones Day lawyers 
representing the firm and Ghezzi in the district court did the research one would 
expect of them, they surely found the decision in St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. 
Commercial Financial Corp.,282 discussed earlier,283 where Judge Bennett criticized 
a lawyer’s discovery objections as “boilerplate, obstructionist, frivolous, overbroad, 
and, significantly, contrary to well-established and long standing federal law.”284 In 
St. Paul, he ordered the lawyer to write a bar journal article explaining why it was 
improper to object as he did.285 Yet, even with published authority indicating the 
possibility of an alternative sanction, Ghezzi and Jones Day never inquired whether 
one might be on the judge’s mind. None of this is to say that Jones Day should have 
conceded that Ghezzi deserved to be sanctioned. It is to say, however, that notice of 
the possibility of an alternative sanction should perhaps not have been given the 
weight in this case that it was. 
Fourth, the court’s embrace of the principle that before “imposing the ‘most 
severe sanctions,’ a district court should provide ‘clear notice’ as to the form of the 
sanction,”286 arguably was a reach. That principle typically applies where the 
potential sanction will substantively affect the party’s case, as where, for example, 
the court might submit an adverse inference instruction, strike the party’s pleadings, 
or dismiss the case.287 The same is true with respect to the court’s observation that a 
district court’s discretion narrows as the severity of the sanction increases.288 Either 
way, in Security National Bank of Sioux City the sanction had no effect on the case. 
The court’s focus on the severity of the sanction, however, raises another 
question: short of issuing an adverse inference instruction, dismissing a party’s case, 
striking a party’s pleadings, or revoking a lawyer’s pro hac vice admission, what 
makes a sanction among the “most severe”? Does any shaming sanction require clear 
notice to the lawyer of its intended form? What if the shaming sanction is 
embarrassing, but, when viewed objectively, cannot reasonably be said to indelibly 
stain the lawyer’s reputation or career, or impair her ability to practice?289 In the 
same vein, the court’s statement that “[s]o unusual a sanction”—that is, the 
production of an intra-firm instructional video—required “particularized notice of 
the nature of the sanction” being contemplated,290 raises the question of what makes 
a sanction sufficiently unusual to trigger the particularized notice requirement. A 
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reflective sanction such as mandatory CLE attendance certainly does not rise to that 
level.291 
Whatever its flaws, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Security National Bank 
of Sioux City is in several respects a positive decision for lawyers and courts alike. 
Again, from courts’ perspective, the Eighth Circuit did not hold that alternative 
sanctions are flatly inappropriate, meaning that district courts in that judicial circuit 
retain the discretion to fashion case- and situation-specific alternative sanctions, and 
that other courts cannot seize on the opinion to forbid the use of alternative sanctions. 
It is important for trial courts to have flexibility when regulating the conduct of 
lawyers appearing before them.292 It is also important for trial courts to have 
sanctioning options apart from monetary sanctions and non-monetary sanctions that 
go to the merits or substance of the case, or to the offending lawyer’s ability to 
practice. The availability of alternative sanctions may be especially important where 
an errant lawyer’s practice is so thin that she cannot afford to pay reasonable 
monetary sanctions,293 or at the other extreme, where the misbehaving lawyer’s 
wealth makes a monetary sanction proportionate to the misconduct at issue the 
equivalent of pocket change.294 
If the court’s elevated scrutiny of the district court’s sanctions order 
prompts trial courts to think carefully when fashioning extraordinary alternative 
sanctions,295 that caution is good for all concerned. Trial courts will satisfy 
themselves that they are focusing on significant misconduct that truly requires 
extraordinary sanctions rather than imposing sanctions out of accumulated 
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(“Although novel sanctions are not objectionable per se, they are subject to close examination on review 
simply because their reasonableness has not been demonstrated.”). 
244 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 47; No.2 
frustration with a lawyer or a case.296 Lawyers are more likely to receive the benefit 
of the doubt in close cases, which is consistent with sanctions doctrine generally.297 
Similarly, if the opinion pushes trial courts to provide particularized notice 
of the nature and severity of the sanctions they are weighing in more cases,298 it 
increases the likelihood that targeted lawyers will provide more detailed and focused 
responses to courts’ show cause orders or to opponents’ motions.299 That, in turn, 
should lead courts to make better sanctions decisions in general. 
At the same time, any benefits that might flow from courts providing 
lawyers with particularized notice of possible alternative sanctions are arguably 
speculative. Competent lawyers who believe they have done nothing wrong are 
guaranteed to vigorously oppose any possible sanctions. In the process, they will 
advise the court of applicable law and material facts justifying their conduct. Thus, 
a particularized notice requirement seems of little benefit either to the court or to the 
offending lawyer. If a lawyer who is threatened with possible shaming sanctions can 
easily afford proportionate monetary sanctions or her firm or client will pay any 
monetary sanction on her behalf, she is sure to argue that if any sanction is imposed, 
it should be monetary. That would seem to defeat the deterrent purpose of the 
sanction, unless the court recognizes the argument for what it is and sticks with the 
shaming sanction—but then the parties have come full circle, because the court 
presumably was considering a shaming sanction in the first place precisely because 
it saw no value in a monetary sanction. In short, particularized notice of possible 
alternative sanctions mostly serves to signal lawyers who lack confidence in their 
own defense that they may wish as a fallback position to urge an alternative sanction 
less severe than the one the court is holding out. 
Finally, in most jurisdictions, a trial court that is seriously disturbed by a 
lawyer’s conduct but concerned that it cannot or should not levy sanctions, may 
condemn the lawyer’s conduct in a published opinion without exposing its decision 
to appellate review provided that it does not (a) expressly denominate its criticism as 
a reprimand; or (b) make specific findings of misconduct.300 Appellate courts refuse 
 
 296. See, e.g., Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., No. 5:14-cv-05025-LLP, 2015 WL 7274448, at *5 
(D.S.D. Nov. 16, 2015) (concluding that the defendant’s repeated assertion of baseless discovery 
objections even after the court held such objections to be invalid, “while unjustified under the Federal 
Rules,” were “not severe enough to warrant the kind of sanctions imposed [by the district court] in Security 
Nat’l”). 
 297. See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(stating that “all doubts should be resolved in favor of the signing attorney” when considering Rule 11 
sanctions); Mustapha v. HSBC Bank, USA, Civ. A. No. 4:12-cv-01924, 2013 WL 632856, at *7 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 20, 2013) (giving the plaintiffs “the benefit of doubt” in declining to impose sanctions while 
cautioning them that their good faith would not be presumed in the future). 
 298. See, e.g., Adams v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. 2:14-CV-02013, 2016 WL 1465433, at *9–
11 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 2016) (citing Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 945 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (giving lawyers notice of sanctions being considered)). 
 299. JOSEPH, supra note 30, § 17(D)(1), at 388. 
 300. See Douglas R. Richmond, Appealing from Judicial Scoldings, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 741, 760 
(2010) (noting the majority approach to lawyers’ appeals from judicial criticism). But cf. Adams v. Ford 
Motor Co., 653 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that the district court’s finding of lawyer 
misconduct unaccompanied by a formal reprimand or monetary penalty was a sanction for appellate 
purposes because it “directly undermine[d] [the lawyer’s] professional reputation and standing in the 
community”). 
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to entertain lawyers’ appeals of routine judicial commentary on their conduct.301 
Thus, in Security National Bank of Sioux City, had the district court declined to 
sanction Ghezzi and instead simply criticized her conduct as obstructionist and 
unjustified in a pretrial ruling on the parties’ deposition designations and objections, 
she would not have had standing to appeal.302 In many cases, judicial criticism of 
lawyers’ conduct in published opinions may deter future misconduct as effectively 
as shaming sanctions. From courts’ perspective, this approach has the advantage of 
avoiding time-consuming ancillary litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts may impose non-monetary sanctions on lawyers in litigation. These 
include what we have called alternative sanctions because they differ from traditional 
non-monetary sanctions that affect a lawyer’s ability to litigate a case, such as 
revoking the lawyer’s pro hac vice admission. Alternative sanctions may further be 
categorized as reflective sanctions where they are intended to cause the offending 
lawyers to reflect on their conduct with a goal of reform, or as shaming sanctions 
where they are intended to shame errant lawyers into improving their behavior and, 
in addition, to deter other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct. The sanction 
imposed by the district court in Security National Bank of Sioux City is now the 
leading example of a shaming sanction, notwithstanding the Eighth Circuit’s reversal 
on appeal. 
Courts considering alternative sanctions should be sure to give lawyers 
particularized notice of the sanctions they are considering and afford the targeted 
lawyers an opportunity to be heard on the issue. They should also act promptly upon 
learning of misconduct by lawyers. Assuming they do these things, any alternative 
sanctions they impose are likely to be upheld on appeal in light of the deferential 
abuse of discretion standard of review that appellate courts apply in sanctions cases. 
From lawyers’ perspective, it is obviously desirable to avoid engaging in 
conduct that may draw a motion for sanctions or that may prompt a trial court to raise 
the possibility of sanctions sua sponte. When lawyers are handling litigation in 
jurisdictions in which they do not regularly practice, a first step toward avoiding 
potential misconduct is to retain knowledgeable local counsel who can advise them 
on customary practice in the jurisdiction. Depending on the case, reasonable research 
of local practices may be a wise investment. Returning to Security National Bank of 
Sioux City, Ghezzi might have avoided the deposition conduct that upset the district 
judge. With the exercise of some diligence or the guidance of capable local counsel, 
she would have known of Van Pilsum v. Iowa State University of Science & 
Technology,303 in which the court sanctioned the plaintiff’s lawyer for repeatedly 
restating the defense lawyer’s questions to “clarify” them for the plaintiff, and for 
consistently interrupting defense counsel to interpose “objections which were thinly 
veiled instructions to the [plaintiff], who would then incorporate” her lawyer’s 
comments in her answers.304 She might also have learned from research locating the 
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 303. 152 F.R.D. 179 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 
 304. Id. at 180. 
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opinion in Rakes v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America,305 if not from local 
counsel, that “the general practice in Iowa permits an objector to state in a few words 
the manner in which the question is defective as to form. . . . Care must be taken by 
the objector, however, to not attempt to suggest an answer, or to influence or ‘coach’ 
the witness.”306 A glance at either case—or the advice of local counsel versed in Iowa 
federal court practice—surely would have caused an excellent lawyer such as Ghezzi 
to rethink her regular deposition practices and style honed in other jurisdictions. 
To be sure, if Ghezzi had never handled cases in Iowa federal courts or had 
done so previously without her deposition practices being challenged, and if her 
deposition practices were the norm in the jurisdictions in which she regularly 
appeared, she would have had no reason to anticipate the possibility of sanctions. 
But that returns us to the importance of capable local counsel who can provide the 
sort of advice and nuts-and-bolts guidance that visiting lawyers may require, and to 
the gathering of intelligence through reasonable legal research in appropriate cases. 
Lawyers who are threatened with sanctions should not respond on their 
own. Rather, they should seek the assistance of other lawyers in their firm or retain 
separate counsel, or both, in defending against any allegations of misconduct. This 
does not mean that targeted lawyers should be excluded from their own defenses; 
after all, they have valuable knowledge to contribute and their interests are at stake. 
Rather, separate counsel are likely to provide a level of objectivity when analyzing 
the situation and formulating a response that a lawyer who is in another party’s or a 
court’s crosshairs cannot. 
In some cases, it may be necessary for lawyers who are facing possible 
sanctions to consider whether they should propose an alternative sanction as a means 
of escaping more serious penalties. This recommendation may gall the affected 
lawyers, but, depending on the facts and the court, it may be a prudent choice. 
Attending a CLE course or writing a bar journal article probably is preferable to a 
more serious monetary or shaming sanction, or to a case-altering non-monetary 
sanction such as revocation of the culpable lawyer’s pro hac vice admission. 
In summary, alternative sanctions are a regular feature on the litigation 
landscape. For lawyers, the keys are first to avoid misconduct supporting sanctions 
of any kind; second to defeat any attempts to impose sanctions, including alternative 
sanctions, at the trial court level; and, third, to minimize or mitigate any sanctions 
that may be imposed. If it is necessary to appeal a sanction, a lawyer must strive to 
build a case in the trial court that is strong enough to overcome the deferential abuse 
of discretion standard that the appellate court will apply. 
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